Terrorism and international criminal law by Schmidt, Sebastian
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
   
Sebastian Schmidt 
Student Number: 2925580 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and  
International Criminal Law 
Supervisor: Prof L Fernandez 
Research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree 
of Master of Laws: Transnational Criminal Justice and Crime 
Prevention 
 
October 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
   
 
I declare that Terrorism and International Criminal Law is my own work, 
that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any 
other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have 
been indicated and acknowledged by complete references. 
Sebastian Schmidt 
 27 October 2009 
Signed:............................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
   
 
 
 
 
To  
Lenny 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
I 
 
Table of content 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
Part I - A Generally Acceptable Definition of Terrorism?.................... 3 
A. Purposes for Defining Terrorism .............................................. 3 
B. Defining Terrorism .................................................................... 5 
I. Etymology ......................................................................... 6 
II. Finding a definition of terrorism in international law ....... 6 
1. The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) .............................. 7 
2. The “UN Anti-Terrorism Treaties” ................................. 9 
3. Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism ........... 12 
4. 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism ....................................................................... 15 
5. Terrorism in International Humanitarian Law .............. 16 
III. Common Elements .......................................................... 17 
1. Objective Elements ........................................................ 17 
2. Subjective Elements ...................................................... 20 
3. A common definition of terrorism in International Law 23 
IV. Scope of application ........................................................ 23 
1. International Element .................................................... 23 
2. The question of a definition - a question of scope? ....... 24 
Part II – Terrorism as a crime under International Law ...................... 26 
A. International terrorism as a war crime .................................... 26 
I. Prohibition of terrorism in International Humanitarian 
Law .................................................................................. 27 
II. Individual Criminal Responsibility ................................. 28 
III. The actus reus of the war crime of spreading terror........ 31 
IV. The mens rea of the war crime of spreading terror ......... 32 
V. Summary .......................................................................... 34 
B. Terrorism as crime against humanity ...................................... 36 
I. Definition of Crimes against Humanity........................... 36 
1. “Widespread” ................................................................ 38 
2. „Sytematic“ .................................................................... 39 
3. „Civilian Population“ .................................................... 40 
4. Article 7 of the ICC Statute ........................................... 41 
II. International Jurisprudence on Terrorism as a Crime 
against Humanity ............................................................. 43 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
II 
 
III. Terrorism as a Crime against Humanity under the ICC 
Statute .............................................................................. 45 
IV. Conclusion ....................................................................... 48 
C. Terrorism as a discrete crime under customary international 
law .......................................................................................... 49 
Résumé .................................................................................................... 52 
List of References .............................................................................. i 
I. International and National Instruments and Statutes .................. i 
II. Cases: ........................................................................................ ii 
III. Books ...................................................................................... iii 
IV. Journal Articles ...................................................................... iv 
Table of Abbreviations ....................................................................... i 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
 
1 
Introduction 
Terrorism has become one of the major plagues of the international  
community1. Therefore, it is necessary to search for the most effective 
countermeasures in International Criminal Law (ICL).  
 
Firstly, there is a need to formulate a generally acceptable definition of 
terrorism. This will permit an examination of whether a successful fight 
against terrorism and punishment of terrorism is possible under the 
existing ICL, or whether there is a need for a discrete crime of terrorism 
under International Law to label conduct as terrorism. 
The aim of this paper is to extract a definition of terrorism and to 
examine whether terrorism can be subsumed under the existing crimes 
of ICL, or whether terrorism should be a free-standing crime of ICL, 
which explicitly declares an act as terroristic. Outstanding scholars like 
Antonio Cassese argue that there is indeed a discrete crime of terrorism 
under international customary law2. Therefore, this paper will analyse 
this view. 
The changing character of terrorism has highlighted for the international 
community the necessity to find means to counteract this new kind of 
threat. The question confronting us is: which measures are currently 
available to combat terrorism are and which can be developed?  
                                                 
1
 Cassese (International Law 2005), 463. 
2
 Cassese (Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International 
Law 2001), 994. 
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The new execution of terroristic acts is characterised by organisations 
operating internationally and by the international division of labour 
amongst them. Therefore, international terrorism can be legally 
combated by the use of International Law. Granting the fact that ICL is a 
successful means of combating terrorism, many questions related to its 
feasibility and concrete application remain unresolved. These difficulties 
and the alleged lack of a generally accepted definition have, notably, led 
to the decision by States negotiating the Rome Statute to exclude 
"terrorism" from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in 19983. 
The fact that several large-scale acts of terrorism have occurred since 
the Rome Conference4 as well as the fact that the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) review conference is likely to revisit the issue have added to 
the topic’s currency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Resolution E, annexed to the Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on an ICC, 17 July 1988, UN Doc A/Conf.183/10.    
4
 For example. the September 11 Attacks in 2001 or the Madrid train bombing in 2004. 
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Part I - A Generally Acceptable Definition of Terrorism? 
 
“We have cause to regret that a legal concept of terrorism was ever 
inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and, above all, 
it serves no operative legal purpose.” 5 
Judge R Baxter6 
A. Purposes for Defining Terrorism 
The fact that a multiplicity of international legal instruments to fight 
terrorism was established7 clarifies that terrorism has become a major 
concern for the international community. It shows that terrorism is no 
longer only a political catchword but also a legal term. Therefore, 
lawyers have to find an abstract definition of what should legally 
constitute terrorism.  
 
Another reason for defining terrorism is its criminalisation. The nullum 
crimen sine lege principle8 obliges the legislative to substantiate the 
prohibited conduct. One can argue that there is no need to criminalise 
                                                 
5
 Baxter (1974), 380. 
6
 A former judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
7
 E.g. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 
15.12.1997, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164, Annex; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, UN GA Res. 59/290 of 15.04.2005; 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 
09.12.1999, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000), Annex; European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism of 27.01.1977, E.T.S. No. 90; 15 ILM, 1272; UN Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism UN GA Res. 49/60 from  09.12.1994. 
8
 Schaack and Slye (2009), 192. 
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and define terrorism as such since terrorism consists of a series of 
conducts already criminalised and defined under domestic law9 (for 
example, murder, bodily harm or damage to property). On an 
international level, under certain circumstances, terroristic acts overlap 
with different categories of crimes (in particular war crimes and crimes 
against humanity)10. Consequently, the question arises whether there is 
an additional advantage gained by labelling criminal conduct as 
“terrorism” or as “terroristic”. 
 
Several reasons for labelling criminal conduct as “terrorism” have been 
identified. Firstly, a definition of terrorism would help to distinguish 
private from political violence. Secondly, a generally accepted definition 
would eliminate the overreach of the many regional anti-terrorism 
treaties and confine the scope of the Security Council’s Resolutions 
since 11 September 2001. The international community’s desire to 
condemn and stigmatise terrorism would be symbolically complied with 
by treating terrorism as a distinct crime. Thirdly, a definition might help 
to confine the misuse of the term by governments against their political 
opponents11.    
 
My new argument for labelling criminal conduct as terrorism accords 
with legal doctrine. Even though criminal conduct can be covered by 
                                                 
9
 Weigend (The Universal Terrorist 2006), 913. 
10
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 10. 
11
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 10. 
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existing crimes, there is reason to give the conduct a distinct label. This 
is the case when the degree of unlawfulness of the conduct would differ 
from the existing covering crime and the conduct violates different 
legally protected interests than the existing covering crime does. 
Depending on the definition of terrorism, the intent of the perpetrator 
is to compel the State or an international organisation to do something 
or to desist from certain conduct. Therefore, one could say that one of 
the legally protected interests against which the crime of terrorism is 
directed is the authority of the State or an international organisation to 
act in the interests of its citizens or members. Furthermore, terroristic 
acts are intended to intimidate a population. This intimidation of a 
population, as well as the compelling of a State or an international 
organisation, gives the crime of terrorism a distinct degree of 
unlawfulness. 
 
B. Defining Terrorism  
Having given reasons for defining terrorism, this paper will deal with the 
controversial question of determining the term “terrorism”. A large 
number of scholars have worked out a plurality of different definitions 
to label conduct as terrorism12. Starting with the origin of the word, the 
paper will particularly focus on the definitions used by international 
legal instruments, dealing with terrorism.  
                                                 
12
 In 2005 a number of 203 different definitions were identified by (Alex Schmidt 2005). 
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I. Etymology 
The word “terrorism” comes from the Latin word terror which means 
“fear” or “scare”. It can be found in all Indo-European languages13. The 
term was first used in the context of the radical republican regime of the 
Jacobins during the French Revolution. It described the violent 
treatment of the opponents of the revolution. Therefore, regime de la 
terreur was a means of maintaining political power14.  
 
II. Finding a definition of terrorism in international law 
On the one hand, many scholars allege that there exists no general 
accepted definition of terrorism in international law15. This allegation is 
normally illustrated by the often cited but trite aphorism: “the one 
person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter16”. On the other 
hand, the thesis is proposed that, in fact a widespread consensus on a 
generally acceptable definition of terrorism has evolved in the 
international community17. This view is based on the idea that there is 
not a lack of definition but of an exception18. Therefore, it is worth 
                                                 
13
 Keber (2008), 1. 
14
 Frohwein (2002), 384.  
15
 Schaack and Slye (2009), 185; Golder and Williams (2004), 272; Lavalle (2007), 89; 
Arnold (The Prosecution of Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity 2004), 980; Proulx 
(2004), 1030. 
16
 George Galloway in a Sky News interview from 6
th
 August 2006. 
17
 Cassese (International Law 2005)499; Cassese (International Criminal Law 2008), 
163. 
18
 Cassese (Terrorism as an International Crime 2004), 214. 
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having a closer look at the international legal instruments and treaties 
which deal with the topic of terrorism. 
 
1. The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism (1937) 
The first attempt of the international community to denounce terrorism, 
the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism, was a reaction to the assassination by 
Croatian separatists of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French 
Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou in October 1934. The international 
community still had the disastrous consequences for global peace in 
mind that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 
1914 had. Finally, the Convention never entered into force, not because 
there was no consensus about the definition of terrorism19, but because 
the Second World War deflected attention from the convention20. 
Article 1 (2) of the Convention defines terroristic acts as:  
 
“criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the mind of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”. 
 
Criminal acts in the sense of article 1, namely crimes against persons 
and property, weapons offences and ancillary offences, were specified 
                                                 
19
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006) But there was dispute on 
extradition provision, which did not exclude terrorism from the political offence 
exception.  
20
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 173. 
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in article 2. States were obliged to criminalise those acts. The definition 
consists of three elements: (1) the intended aim, which is a state of 
terror, (2) the target, a State and (3) the prohibit means, criminal acts as 
defined in article 2. This definition does not refer to any ideological 
intention.  
 
The weaknesses of this definition are firstly its tautological character, 
which is caused by the description of the aim (“a state of terror”), which 
is not explained in the treaty21. It suggests that this term should mean 
extreme and continuing fear. Secondly, the definition of the target 
(“directed against a State”) is on the one hand open to broad 
interpretation, but on the other hand excludes private persons and 
groups. The convention contains neither an international element nor 
does it answer the question whether the Convention is applicable in the 
context of armed conflicts22.  
 
Even though the League of Nations Convention never entered into force 
and its definition of terrorism suffers from some weaknesses, it can be 
said that the Convention offered the first definition of terrorism, thus 
serving as a benchmark definition of terrorism for many years23. For the 
first time it codified the customary rule that States are obligated to 
counteract terroristic preparation acts on their territory24.  
                                                 
21
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 174. 
22
 Keber (2008), 51. 
23
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 175. 
24
 Keber (2008), 51. 
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2. The “UN Anti-Terrorism Treaties” 
The international community shied away from any attempt to fight 
terrorism on a general basis or as a deductive approach and followed a 
different line in dealing with the problem25. Instead of defining 
terrorism in general, the international community limited the scope of 
the conventions to specific acts of terrorism26. This so-called sectoral or 
inductive approach27 produced a number of conventions and 
protocols28, requiring states to prohibit certain physical acts. Only a few 
of them prohibit conduct as specifically “terrorist” offences. Most of 
them do not refer to a political motive or cause behind the act, or a 
dolus specialis to intimidate or terrorise29. This inductive model avoids 
the question of definition in order to achieve consensus on international 
                                                 
25
 Kolb (2004), 229. 
26
 Kolb (2004), 229. 
27
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 130. 
28
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 14 December 1973; International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 
1979; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997; International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism New York, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 13 April 2005; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963; Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 
1970, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971; Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on 3 March 1980; Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at 
Rome on 10 March 1988; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. 
29
 (Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 131. 
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instruments fighting terrorism. On the one hand, this can be seen as a 
confirmation of the allegation that there is a lack of a generally accepted 
definition of terrorism. On the other hand, it also confirms the strong 
will of the international community to criminalise and banish the 
phenomenon of terrorism.  
 
The inductive approach’s shortcoming is obvious: New forms of 
technology will lead to new forms of terrorism not covered by the 
existing sectoral definitions30. New treaties must be developed, covering 
only acts committed after the adoption of the treaty, while the act that 
initially led to the new conventions does not fall within its scope. This 
illustrates the mere reactive character of this method31. Furthermore, 
the sectoral approach meets with criticism because it is questioned why 
a certain act is labelled as terroristic at all. If these acts have a common 
overreaching, defining feature, for which these acts are understood as 
terrorism, then this feature has to be formulated. This would enable the 
determination of a general definition of terrorism. Therefore, the 
sectoral approach is of no assistance for the purpose of developing a 
general definition of the term terrorism.  
 
Nevertheless, there is one exception in this series of conventions, 
namely the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
                                                 
30
 Golder and Williams (2004), 287. 
31
 Wolny (2006), 238. 
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Nations on 9 December 1999. This convention establishes, apart from a 
reference to the specific approach of conventions, a general definition 
of terrorism. Article 2 (1)(b) of this convention reads:  
 
“Any *...+ act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act.” 
 
It should be noted on the one hand that this definition draws no 
distinction between politically motivated acts and acts motivated by 
private aims32. On the other hand a subjective element could be inferred 
from the wording “nature or context” of the act itself. This means that 
the actor does not have to be proven to intimidate a population 
intentionally, or to compel a government or an international 
organisation, but it has to be proven, on the actus reus, that the crime 
was committed in a “context” that is indicative of terrorism. As far as 
labelling conduct as terroristic depends on the special intent of the 
actor, this rule of proof appears to be unsuitable since the mens rea 
does not differ from ordinary crimes33. Nevertheless, the UN Security 
Council (UN SC) resolution 137334 transformed this Convention 
practically into applicable law35.  
                                                 
32
 Arnold (The ICC as a New Instrument for Repressing Terrorism 2004), 26. 
33
 Weigend (The Universal Terrorist 2006), 924. 
34
 UN SC Res 1373 of  28th September  2001.  
35
 Weigend (Terrorismus als Rechtsproblem 2006), 159. 
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3. Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism  
In 1996 the UN GA established by resolution 51/210 the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee on Terrorism. The task of the Committee is to draft a treaty 
containing a comprehensive definition on terrorism, to eliminate 
international terrorism by criminalising it. The informal text of article 2 
(1) of the convention36, which defines the offence of terrorism reads: 
 
(1) Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if that 
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State 
or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the 
environment; or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of 
this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the 
conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 
 
This definition uses the identical wording in regards to the intention 
requirements as the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. Consequently, there is also no element of 
subjective intention that the violent act was calculated to achieve a 
superior political aim37. Even though the Committee was very close to a 
                                                 
36
 Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/59/894 
App. II (12 August 2005). 
37
 See B II 2 for critique.   
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consensus of a complete text of a convention38 and there was basic 
agreement on the definition of offences39 , there is no complete 
consensus reached yet and it does not appear that this will be the case 
in the short term. The deadlock originates from a proposal introduced 
by Malaysia, on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)40. The aim of the proposal is to add to the draft convention a 
clause which excludes from the scope of application of the convention 
the acts of parties to an armed conflict in situations of foreign 
occupation aimed at liberation and self-determination. So far the only 
exemption envisaged was laid down in article 18 of the Draft 
Convention, where it is conceptualised to except armed forces in armed 
conflicts from the scope of the convention.  
 
Therefore, the dispute firstly was, whether, as proposed by the OIC 
proposal, to exclude activities from “parties” instead of activities from 
“armed forces” in an “armed conflict”. Such exception for “parties” 
rather than for “armed forces” would include organisations such as 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Hamas, Islamic Jihad or Hezbollah41.  
 
                                                 
38
 Lavalle (2007), 111. 
39
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 185. 
40
 The proposal was not only supported by the 56 OIC Members States and Palestine, 
but also by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab League. 
41
 The International Committee of the Red Cross advocated that „armed forces“ should 
cover both, government forces as well organised armed groups. This appears to be a 
passable solution, since it includes „quasi-armed forces“ without using a too broad 
term.  
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Secondly, the point of contention emerged, whether “situations of 
foreign occupation”, in addition to “armed conflicts” should also be 
excluded from the scope of the Convention42. Broadening the scope of 
the exception to “situations of foreign occupation”, in other words, to 
situations, which are not strictly armed conflicts in the sense of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), would, for example, exclude acts 
in the territories in Palestine, occupied by Israel, and in Kashmir, 
occupied by India. It appears that such a broad exception clause would 
thwart the purpose of the convention by disposing of the most relevant 
areas of its application43. 
 
The third controversial issue is the question whether military forces of a 
State are liable under the convention in cases of violating international 
law44. The OIC proposal supports the applicability of the convention to 
“State terrorism” and “State sponsored terrorism” albeit the already 
existing applicability of international law, namely the IHL. If this liability 
were included, the question arises why acts of non-State forces are not 
qualified in the same way when they violate international law.45  
                                                 
42
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 188. 
43
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 188. 
44
 In particular, ICL, IHL and the Law on State responsibility.  
45
 Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 189. 
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4. 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism46 
The declarations of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) do not bind its 
members47. But they express, as far as they are accepted by a majority 
vote, the opinion of the international community and can prove the 
existence of customary rules. Therefore, it seems to be necessary to 
examine whether there are definitions of terrorism in these 
declarations. The 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, adopted by the Assembly without a vote, reads 
in paragraph 3:  
 
“Criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them [...]. 
 
This provision was not explicitly presented as a definition, but it can 
serve this function by implication. Consequently, this definition would 
encompass three elements: The actus reus requires (1) a (national) 
criminal act. The mens rea demands that (2) the act must be intended to 
provoke a state of terror48 and (3) the purpose to provoke this state of 
terror must be political. The fact that paragraph 3 refers to political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other 
                                                 
46
 UN GA Resolution 49/60 (1994). 
47
 Brownlie (2008), 15. 
48
 See above the comments in respect to the League of Nations Conventions. 
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considerations is, strictly speaking, not part of the definition, but 
clarifies that these acts are not justifiable. Some authors hold the view 
that this declaration, including the clarification of the unjustifiable 
character of the described acts, has entered into customary law by 
annually “recalling” this declaration in the UN GA resolutions49 on 
terrorism50. 
 
5. Terrorism in International Humanitarian Law 
IHL contains several provisions that prohibit acts of terrorism. Article 33 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention reads, inter alia, that ‘‘*c+ollective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are 
prohibited.’’ Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which deals with international armed conflicts, 
and 13(2) of Protocol II, which deals with non-international armed 
conflicts, state that ‘‘Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.’’  
Therefore, the Additional Protocols can be seen as to include a 
definition of terrorism. The actus reus of this definition is an act or 
threat of violence. Since the violent act is not specified, it also covers 
acts not directed against civilians. The mens rea requires that the 
primary purpose of the violent act was to spread terror among the 
                                                 
49
 UN GA Resolutions 50/53 (1995), 51/110 (1996), 52/165 (1997), 53/108 (1998), 
54/110 (1999), 55/158(2000), 56/88 (2001), 57/27 (2002), 58/81 (2003), 69/46 (2004).  
50
 Lavalle (2007), 101; Cassese (International Criminal Law 2008), 165, Against this view 
Saul (Defining Terrorism in International Law 2006), 210. 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
 
17 
civilian population. The intention to spread terror among civilians is the 
determining element for defining acts of terrorism. This is due to the 
fact that in armed conflicts any use of deadly force may create fear 
among bystanders, albeit the attack may be lawful in the context of IHL.  
 
III. Common Elements 
After presenting some of the approaches that have been made to 
generally define international terrorism, I will examine whether there 
are common elements which can form the core of a definition of 
terrorism in International Law.  
 
1. Objective Elements 
The starting point of all definitions is a physical act. Some definitions, as 
in the League of Nations Convention, or the definition in the 1994 UN 
Declaration explicitly term the act “criminal”. Others require an “act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury” (Financing Convention) 
or ‘‘*a+cts or threats of violence” (Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions). The Draft Comprehensive Convention also contains acts 
which are directed against public or private property and states that the 
acts have to be unlawful. Therefore, it can be held that all these 
definitions require a physical act that is committed to cause death or 
serious bodily injury.  
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The question arises as to why some definitions label the act as unlawful 
or even criminal and others not? On the one hand, it sounds logical that 
lawful acts cannot qualify as acts which constitute terrorism. On the 
other hand, it seems to be unclear which legal standard should 
determine an act as unlawful or criminal. In most legal systems, causing 
death or bodily injury to another person is unlawful. Therefore one can 
say that the physical act should be an act causing death or bodily injury 
which is “normally criminalised under any national penal system”51. The 
reason that the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions do not 
refer to criminal acts is due to the fact that causing death or bodily 
injury to persons is not necessarily criminal in armed conflicts. 
Therefore, the definition of terrorism in IHL cannot been considered as a 
deviation from the rule but as an adjustment to the particular situation 
of an armed conflict.  
 
The next element is the target against which the act is directed.  The 
League of Nations Convention refers only to a State as a possible target 
of the criminal act. On the contrary, the Financing Convention refers “to 
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities”. The 1994 UN Declaration as well as the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention and the Additional Protocols do not determine a specific 
target. Therefore one could say that they include unlawful acts directed 
against the State, including its armed forces, as well as acts directed 
                                                 
51
 Cassese (International Criminal Law 2008), 165. 
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against civilians. The League of Nations Convention, as mentioned 
above, was a reaction of the international community to the 
assassination of the King of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister. 
One can argue that the definition was only established to cover acts 
directed against representatives of a State. Therefore the purpose of 
this Convention was not to cover all acts of terrorism but only terrorism 
against State representatives. Thus the League of Nations Convention 
follows a concept similar to the sectoral conventions and does not claim 
to cover all acts of terrorism. This argumentation is sound since most 
acts labelled as terroristic by the public and condemned as terrorism by 
the international community are directed against civilians52. Therefore, 
the League of Nations Convention was not intended to determine all 
possible targets of a terroristic act.  
 
More debatable is the question whether only civilians and other persons 
not taking a direct part in armed hostilities or whether combatants, too, 
can be considered as targets of terrorist acts. The Terrorism Financing 
Convention excluded from its scope situations of armed conflicts (article 
2 (1)(b))53. Therefore there was no need to include combatants as a 
possible target. Cassese points out that the general exemption of armed 
conflicts goes too far because it leaves military personnel unprotected 
from terroristic attacks by civilians54. The Draft Comprehensive 
                                                 
52
 For example the attacks in New York on 11. September 2001, the  bombings in 
London on 7. July or the bombings in Madrid on11. March 2004. 
53
 Because this situations are covered by IHL. 
54
 Cassese (International Criminal Law 2003), 127.  
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Convention does not exclude the entire situation of an armed conflict 
from its scope of application, but only acts from armed forces in armed 
conflicts. Therefore, the wording of the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention also contains unlawful acts against combatants. The 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions do not require that 
terrorist acts necessarily or exclusively strike civilians or the civilian 
infrastructure55. According to the wording, even acts that are aimed at 
lawful targets can serve as a basis for terrorism in IHL. It remains in 
question why the definition of the Additional Protocols goes further 
than definitions covering terrorism in peace-times, where lawful acts 
cannot constitute acts of terrorism56. Finally, one can conclude that all 
modern definitions include civilians and persons not taking an active 
part in hostilities as possible targets against which the unlawful act of 
terrorism is directed.  
 
2. Subjective Elements 
The subjective element can be described as the “labelling element” 
since only the mens rea turns an ordinary criminal into a terrorist57. 
Apart from the intent regarding the performance of the violent act there 
appears to be a special intent requirement in nearly all definitions of 
terrorism. The League of Nations Convention requires that the act has to 
                                                 
55
 Gasser (2002), 556. 
56
The ICTY stated in Prosecutor v Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T of 5. December 2003, para. 
136:“ With respect to the “acts of violence”, these do not include legitimate attacks 
against combatants but only unlawful attacks against civilians“. 
57
 Weigend (The Universal Terrorist 2006), 924. 
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be “intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the mind of 
particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”. The 
1994 UN Declaration adopted almost the same wording. Similarly, the 
definition in the Additional Protocols requires that the primary purpose 
of the act is to spread terror among the civilian population. The Draft 
Comprehensive Convention requires as one variant of the mens rea that 
the purpose (by its nature or context)58 to commit the act is to 
intimidate a population. The identical wording is used in the Terrorism 
Financing Convention. The latter two conventions alternatively require 
that the purpose of the act is to compel a government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from effecting any act.  
 
On the one hand, all these definitions have as a common element, 
namely that the purpose of the act is to spread terror among the civilian 
population. On the other hand, some definitions alternatively require a 
subjective element of coercion. On closer examination of the 
relationship of the element of spreading fear and the element of 
coercion it becomes apparent that spreading fear and compelling are 
not alternative elements but relate to each other as means and end of 
an act. The spreading of fear among the population is the means for 
compelling a government or an international organisation to do or to 
abstain from doing any act. Means and end violate different legal 
interests. The coercion violates the authority of a State or an 
                                                 
58
 This wording makes this subjective element practically to an objective element, see 
above II 3.  
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international organisation to act in the interests of its citizens or 
members, whereas, spreading fear among the population violates the 
individual and collective peace among a population. Therefore, a 
comprehensive definition should require both elements cumulatively.   
 
Another element, the existing of which deserves discussion, is the 
motive or superordinate aim. Only the 1994 UN Declaration refers to a 
superior motive by stating that the criminal act, which was intended to 
provoke a state of terror, has to be committed for political purposes. On 
the one hand, many scholars have pointed out that only the political or 
ideological motive turns an ordinary crime into a terroristic one59, since 
it distinguishes terrorist offences from ordinary crimes (murder, hostage 
taking etc.) This is not entirely true, because, as mentioned above, the 
purpose to spread fear as well as the purpose to coerce is also a 
distinguishing feature of terrorism. On the other hand, it does not 
appear that a certain ideology which motivates the actor, lends the 
crime a higher degree of unlawfulness than it would have if the motive 
was to act for private ends. Furthermore, the requirement of such an 
element could meet critique because the existence of an ideological 
motive would establish the offence60. Thus, the absence of an 
ideological motive requirement in most conventions appears not as 
grave as claimed. 
                                                 
59
 Weigend (The Universal Terrorist 2006), 923; Cassese (International Criminal Law 
2008), 167.  
60
 As described by the German phrase „Gesinnungsstrafrecht“. 
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3. A common definition of terrorism in International Law 
Summarizing the above mentioned common elements of definitions of 
terrorism, it can be held that terrorism in International Law is: 
  
(a) an act causing death or bodily injury to civilians and persons not 
taking an active part in hostilities (which is normally criminal under 
domestic law), (b) when the purpose of the conduct is to intimidate a 
population (c) as means to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act. In conclusion, one can 
say there is a “lowest common denominator” determining the elements 
of terrorism which establish a general accepted definition. 
IV. Scope of application 
The question of the scope of the definition is, on the one hand, the 
question when terrorism can be considered international terrorism and, 
on the other hand, in which situations and to whom the definition 
should apply. 
 
1. International Element 
Terrorism is an issue of international concern inasmuch as it affects the 
interests of more than one State. Terrorism as a war crime would have 
an international element due to the context of organised violence as a 
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result of an armed conflict61. Terrorism in time of peace must be 
“transnational in nature” to qualify as international terrorism62. In the 
words of the Terrorism Financing Convention this means that “the 
offence” is not international as long as it is “committed within a single 
state, the *…+ offender is a national of the State and is present in the 
territory of that State and no other State has a basis *…+ to exercise 
jurisdiction *…+”63.     
 
2. The question of a definition - a question of scope? 
Cassese states that the alleged lack of a definition is indeed a lack of an 
agreement on the exception64. As mentioned above, this view is based 
on the idea that the scope of application in the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention is the only controversial point the international community 
is struggling with. Such an exception clause would not affect the 
definition as such. Others state that there is, strictly speaking, no 
exception to a definition65. In my opinion, both views have their merits. 
On the one hand, it appears that an exception of a definition naturally 
would be part of a definition. But, on the other hand, the exception in 
the Draft Convention does not affect the definition as such, but 
determines the scope of application of the specific Convention. The 
reason why the Draft Comprehensive Convention excludes some acts, 
                                                 
61
 Werle (2005), 29. 
62
 Cassese (International Criminal Law 2008), 166. 
63
 Article 3 of the Convention for the Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorist. 
64
 Cassese (Terrorism as an International Crime 2004), 214. 
65
 Lavalle (2007), 113. 
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which are covered by the definition, from its scope of application is that 
such acts of terrorism are already legally governed by international 
(humanitarian) law. This illustrates the main weakness of the OIC 
proposal, since it does not provide any alternative legal basis, which 
governs the terroristic acts that are proposed to be excluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
 
26 
Part II – Terrorism as a crime under International Law 
 
„Terrorism is the war of the poor, and war is the terrorism of the rich. “ 
 
Sir Peter Alexander Ustinov66 
 
After determining the object of investigation I will now move to the 
question whether international terrorism is banned by crimes under 
international law, namely war crimes and crimes against humanity and 
whether there is a crime of terrorism under customary international 
law.    
 
A. International terrorism as a war crime 
War crimes are violations of a rule of international humanitarian law, 
which creates direct criminal responsibility under international law67. 
Consequently, the first step is to have a look whether there are rules of 
international humanitarian law prohibiting terrorism. Secondly, one 
must examine whether such a rule creates direct criminal responsibility 
under international law.   
 
                                                 
66
 The original quote reads: “Terrorismus ist der Krieg der Armen und der Krieg ist der 
Terrorismus der Reichen." 
67
  Werle (2005), 269. 
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I. Prohibition of terrorism in International Humanitarian Law 
Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 prohibits “collective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism” 
against protected persons in international armed conflict. The term 
“terrorism” is not defined by the Convention. The prohibition in article 
33 is understood as an addition to the “general prohibition” in article 27 
of violence and inhumane treatment against civilians68. This protection 
extends only to persons “in the hands of a Party to the conflict”69 This 
prohibition is an expression of customary international law70. 
 
Article 4(2)(d) of Additional Protocol II prohibits “acts of terrorism” 
against “all persons who do not take a direct part or have ceased to take 
part in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts “at any time and 
in any place whatsoever”, as well as threats to commit such acts. 
 
As mentioned above, acts or threats of violence of which the primary 
purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited 
by IHL, namely Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of 
Additional Protocol II. Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts 
as well as “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
                                                 
68
 Saul (Crimes and Prohibitions of ‘Terror’ and ‘Terrorism’ in Armed: 1919-2005 2005), 
268. 
69
 Article 4 of  the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
70
 Blaškid Appeal Judgment, para. 145; Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, para. 220. 
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resistance”71, whereby Additional Protocol II applies to civilians in non-
international conflicts. It is worth discussing when terrorist acts cross 
the threshold to trigger the application of humanitarian law. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has held 
that instances of “terrorist attacks” do not amount to an armed 
conflict72. Therefore, terroristic acts have to occur in the context of an 
armed conflict to be relevant conduct for IHL.  
 
Furthermore, debatable is whether this norm is customary international 
law73. The prohibitions do not contain new principles but rather codify 
in a unified manner the prohibition of attacks on the civilian 
population.74 These prohibitions reflect the basic principles of IHL. 
Therefore, these provisions dealing with terror and terrorism in the 
fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols reflect 
customary humanitarian law or turned into it75.  
 
II. Individual Criminal Responsibility  
The provisions referring to terror or terrorism in the fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Additional Protocols are not labelled as crimes but 
                                                 
71
 1977 Protocol I, Article 1(3). 
72
 ICTY TC Prosecutor v Delalid et al, Case No IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998,  
para. 185. 
73
 Article 51 of Additional Protocol I was adopted with 77 votes in favor, one against 
and 16 abstentions. No State that did not vote in favor expressed any concern as to the 
content of the prohibition contained in Article 51(2). Article 13 of Additional Protocol 
was adopted consensual. 
74
 ICTY AC Prosecutor v Galid, Case No IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, para. 87. 
75
  (Cassese, International Criminal Law 2008), 172.  
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as prohibitions76. They are not defined as grave breaches in article 147 
of the fourth Geneva Convention, respectively, in article 85 of the First 
Additional Protocol. Therefore, one has to examine whether a 
customary international rule exists which leads to individual criminal 
responsibility. The ICTY decides inter alia by means of examining state 
practice, indicating an intention to criminalise the prohibition, including 
statements by government officials and international organisations, as 
well as punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals 
whether a prohibition leads to individual criminal responsibility77. In 
March 1919 the so-called Commission on Responsibilities, a body 
created by the Preliminary Peace Conference of Paris to inquire into 
breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by Germany and its 
allies during the First World War, established a list of war crimes. The 
first listed crime was “murders and massacres; systematic terrorism” of 
civilians78. In the end, there was no one charged with the crime of 
“systematic terror” in the Leipzig War Crimes Trials. The Appeal 
Chamber of the ICTY lists in the Galid judgment a number of domestic 
provisions criminalising acts of terrorising civilians as a method of 
warfare79. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber found that customary 
international law imposes individual criminal liability for violations of 
the prohibition of terror against the civilian population as enshrined in 
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional 
                                                 
76
  Saul (Crimes and Prohibitions of ‘Terror’ and ‘Terrorism’ in Armed: 1919-2005 2005), 
272. 
77
  ICTY AC Prosecutor v Galid, Case No IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, para. 92. 
78
  Werle (2005), 4. 
79
 ICTY AC Prosecutor v Galid, Case No IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, fn 297. 
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Protocol II80. Against the view that there is individual criminal 
responsibility under customary international law it could be argued that 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not provide for 
any crime which specifically corresponds to the mentioned provisions of 
the Additional Protocols in article 8 (2)81. However, article 10 of the 
Statute reads “Nothing in this part shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law 
for purposes other than this Statute”. This means that the drafters of 
the Statute did not claim to incorporate all crimes under international 
law exhaustively. Therefore, international crimes outside the Statute 
may exist.     
 
Strong indicators for the existence of individual criminal responsibility 
under customary international law can be found in the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Article 4(d) of the ICTR Statute provides that the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction over violations of common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions as well as the Second Additional Protocol and 
explicitly provides for jurisdiction over “acts of terrorism”. Article 3(d) of 
the SCSL Statute grants the Court jurisdiction over “acts of terrorism”82.  
                                                 
80
 Against this view was Judge Schomburg. In the Trial Chamber Judge Rafael Nieto-
Navia formulated a dissenting opinion regarding this question.   
81
  Werle (2005), 344. 
82
 See for example Count 1 in Prosecution‘s Second Amended Indictment in Prosecutor 
v Taylor, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 29 May 2007.  
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III. The actus reus of the war crime of spreading terror 
The Additional protocols prohibit “Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited’’. This must be understood as part of the 
superior prohibition of IHL to attack civilians. The definition uses the 
term “acts or threats of violence”. Article 49 (1) of Additional Protocol I 
defines “attacks” as “acts of violence”. The actus reus of the offence 
should be interpreted within the light of the general, superior 
prohibition.  Therefore, the attacks must be directed against civilians. 
Thus, a lawful attack against a military target, even if its primary 
purpose was to spread terror among the civilian population, can not 
constitute the war crime of terror83 Consequently, only attacks directed 
against civilians or other persons not taking an active part in the 
hostilities can constitute the crime. Furthermore, the question has to be 
answered whether the acts or threats of violence have de facto to cause 
“death or serious bodily injury”. In the Galid case the Court did not have 
to decide this question, since the sniping of civilians in Sarajevo84 caused 
actual deaths and serious bodily injuries.  
 
It appears that there exists a threshold of de facto causing death or 
serious bodily injury. What speaks against the existence of such a 
threshold is that the war crime of terror is not a war crime against 
                                                 
83
 Against this view: ICTY AC Prosecutor v Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, 30 November 
2006, para 102. 
84
 This was the conduct that Galid was, inter alia, charged with. 
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persons but a war crime by employing methods of prohibited warfare. 
The prohibited method of warfare is the spreading of terror among the 
civilian population. Thus, the main element of wrongdoing is not a 
causing of death or serious bodily injury but the use of the prohibited 
method of warfare. 
 
Nevertheless, article 85 (3)(a), of the First Additional Protocol expressly 
defines the act of making the civilian population or individual civilians 
the object of attack as a grave breach as long as it results in death or 
serious injury to body or health. Therefore, it appears that a violation of 
the prohibition only leads to individual criminal responsibility as long as 
the act of violence causes actual death or serious bodily injury.   
 
The question whether mere “threats of violence” can constitute the 
crime also remained open in the Galid case. In the light of the above-
mentioned this has to be negated, since a mere threat will not cause 
death or bodily injury. 
IV. The mens rea of the war crime of spreading terror  
The wording of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of 
Additional Protocol II does not require that the acts of violence must 
have actually spread terror among the civilian population, but rather 
have the purpose to do so. The travaux préparatoires to Additional 
Protocol I illustrate that there had been attempts during the drafting to 
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replace the original wording from the purpose to spread terror among 
the civilian population to a de facto infliction of terror among the civilian 
population. Nevertheless, this proposed replacement was rejected85. In 
the light of the fact that that the waging of war leads to similar effects 
as the spreading of terror among the civilian population, it is sound that 
the purpose to spread terror intentionally was the decisive element for 
scrutinizing such acts. The ICTY holds the same view by stating “*t+he 
mens rea of the crime of acts of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population is composed of the 
specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population”86. 
  
The term “spreading terror” is undefined and deserves interpretation. 
As mentioned above, the word terror means scare or fear. The ICTY 
stated that terror means “extreme fear”87. The word “extreme” suggests 
that a certain magnitude of fear has been caused. Rather the actor has 
to have the intent to bring the civilian population in an extraordinary 
state of fear. This is certainly the case where the civilian population is in 
a state of mortal fear.  
 
Further, the wording of the prohibition suggests that the purpose to 
spread terror among the civilian population need not to be the exclusive 
purpose to commit the acts of violence. Therefore, the question arises 
                                                 
85
 Travaux préparatoires, Vol. III, p. 203 
86
 ICTY AC Judgment, Prosecutor v Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, para 
104. 
87
 ICTY TC Judgment, Prosecutor v Delalid et al, Case No IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998,  
para. 137. 
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how purposes other than the leitmotif of terrorising the population 
carry weight. The prohibition uses the word “primary” purpose. 
Consequently, the existence of other purposes is innocuous as long as 
the spreading of terror was the major reason to commit the acts of 
violence. The ICTY stated that the intent to spread terror among the 
civilian population has to be principal among the aims and that such 
intent can be inferred “from the circumstances of the acts or threats, 
that is from their nature, manner, timing and duration”88. This rule of 
derivation is evocative of the term “by its nature or context” as used in 
some anti-terrorism treaties89.  
 
The definition of terrorism, as it has been developed above, requires 
intent to compel a government or an international organisation to take 
a certain action. This requirement is not included in the prohibition of 
the Additional Protocols, since the general aim of warfare is to defeat 
the enemy. Therefore, it can be held that latently all acts of warfare are 
intended to compel the enemy’s government to capitulate.  
V. Summary      
The question whether there presently exists a war crime of spreading 
terror among the civilian population should be answered in the positive. 
The ICTY does neither use the term “war crime of terrorism” nor does it 
                                                 
88
 ICTY AC Judgment, Prosecutor v Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, para 
104. 
89
 See for example Article 2 (1)(a)International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 
December 1999. 
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use the term “war crime terror” in its sentences90. The question looms 
large: is the war crime of spreading terror the equivalent of terrorism in 
an armed conflict? 
 
A petitio principii would be to argue: since terror is an element of the 
crime the crime is terrorism. As defined above, terrorism requires three 
elements. 
  
Firstly, there must be an act causing death or bodily injury to civilians 
and persons not taking an active part in hostilities. As clarified, not all 
acts or threats of violence lead to individual criminal responsibility. 
Rather, only acts (not threats) causing death or serious bodily injury do 
so. Furthermore, since attacks against lawful targets cannot constitute 
the crime, only attacks again civilians and persons not taking an active 
part in hostilities are elements of the crime.  
 
Secondly, the purpose of the conduct is to intimidate a population. 
Spreading terror among the civilian population means to create a state 
of extreme fear among the civilian population. This is obviously 
intimidating the civilian population.  
 
Thirdly, the spreading of extreme fear must be a means to compel a 
government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing 
                                                 
90
 ICTY TC Judgment, Prosecutor v Delalid et al, Case No IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998,  
para 769. 
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any act. As mentioned, there is no element of compelling required for 
the war crime of spreading terror. Rather, in all acts of warfare there is a 
latent intent to compel the enemy’s government to capitulate.  
 
Consequently, the spreading terror can be labelled as the war crime of 
terrorism, since it fulfils all elements of the definition developed above. 
B. Terrorism as crime against humanity 
The crime of terrorism, as it has been defined above, could also 
constitute a crime against humanity. It is therefore necessary to 
examine how different international legal bodies have dealt with this 
question. Consequently, what will be examined now is how crimes 
against humanity are defined, how different international tribunals, 
namely the ICTY and the ICTR, have reacted to this problem and 
whether terrorism is covered by the ICC Statute as a crime against 
humanity. 
 
I. Definition of Crimes against Humanity 
According to article 5 of the ICTY Statute, the actus reus elements of the 
crime against humanity are that (1) one or more of the listed crimes (2) 
have been committed in an armed conflict, (3) and were directed 
against any civilian population.  
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It should be noted that a nexus to an armed conflict is required. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal itself has stated that such a nexus is no longer 
required under customary law91. An attack is a course of conduct 
involving the commission of acts of violence92. The commission of such a 
crime is considered an attack. For this attack to be considered directed 
against a civilian population it must be widespread or systematic93. The 
underlying offence does not have to be an attack itself as long as it 
comprises part of a pattern of widespread and systematic crimes 
directed against a civilian population94. 
 
Similarly, according to article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the elements, which 
have to be met for the actus reus of the crime against humanity are that 
(1) the act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack, (2) the act 
must be committed against members of the civilian population, (3) the 
act must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, (4) the act must be 
inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health as enlisted in article 3. 
 
What needs to be noted is that a nexus with an armed conflict is not 
required according to the ICTR Statute. On the other hand, the act must 
                                                 
91
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Tadid, Case IT-94-1, 15 July 1999,  para. 78. 
92
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, Case No IT-96-23, 22 February 2001, 
para. 415. 
93
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Tadid, Case IT-94-1, 7 May 1997para. 646. 
94
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, Case No IT-96-23, 22 February 2001, 
para. 417. 
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be committed on discriminatory grounds. Such an attack may be non-
violent in its nature, like imposing a system of apartheid or exerting 
pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, if orchestrated 
on a massive scale or in a systematic manner95. 
  
We may note the fact, that the definitions of a crime against humanity 
according to the ICTY and the ICTR are concurrent, apart from the 
requirements of a nexus to the war and the commitment on 
discriminatory grounds, which were in each case introduced to limit the 
scope of the respective jurisdiction. Consequently, it is useful to 
examine the specific elements of these definitions in conjunction. 
 
The key questions in regard to those definitions are whether there is a 
systematic and widespread attack and what elements constitute a 
civilian population. 
 
1. “Widespread” 
As regards the question of a “widespread occurrence”, the ICTY has held 
that this term refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the 
number of targeted persons96 or large-scale attacks and a large number 
                                                 
95
 ICTR TC Judgment Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4, 2 September 1998, 
para. 581. 
96
 ICTY AC Judgment Prosecutor v Kordic, Case No IT-95-14-2A, 17 December 2004, 
para.94. 
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of victims97. In one of its judgment by the ICTR clarified that the concept 
of “widespread” indicates a massive, frequent, large scale action, carried 
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims98. 
 
2. „Sytematic“ 
As to the question of a systematic occurrence, the ICTY originally held 
that there needs to be a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the 
attack is perpetrated, or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, to 
destroy, persecute or weaken a community, and the perpetration of a 
criminal act on a very large scale against a group of civilians, or the 
repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one 
another, and the preparation and use of significant public or private 
resources, whether military or other, and the implication of high-level 
political and/or military authorities in the definition, and establishment 
of the methodical plan, whereas it suffices if individuals with de facto 
power or organised in a criminal gang can also be liable99. Similarly the 
ICTR has stated that “systematic” refers to thoroughly organised act, 
which follow a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving 
substantial public or private resources. This policy must, however, not 
                                                 
97
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, Case No IT-96-23, 22 February 2001, 
para 429. 
98
 ICTR TC Judgment Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4, 2 September 1998, 
para. 580. 
99
 ICTY TC Judgment Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case No IT-95-14, 3 March 2000, para. 188. 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
 
40 
be adopted formally as the policy of a state but there must be some 
kind of preconceived plan or policy100.  
 
Later, though, the ICTY as well as the ICTR both interpreted this element 
as to be defined as an organised nature of the acts of violence and the 
improbability of their random occurrence. The requirement of a policy 
or a plan was dropped101. 
 
3.  „Civilian Population“ 
In regard to the term „civilian population” it is held that it includes 
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
persons placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any 
other cause102. In a context short of an armed conflict, this includes all 
persons, except those entrusted with the maintenance of order and 
those possessing legitimate means to exercise force, especially 
members of the police force and other representatives of the executive 
power103. Just as in regard to combatants the specific situation of the 
victim is decisive rather than its general status. The targeted population 
                                                 
100
 ICTR TC Judgment Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4, 2 September 1998, 
para. 580. 
101
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must only be predominantly civilian in nature. The presence of certain 
non-civilians does not change the character of the population104.  
Under both statutes the deciding mental element is the knowledge of 
the broader context in which the offence occurs105. Under ICTY a further 
motivation is irrelevant106, while under ICTR the execution of crimes 
solely for personal motives is excluded107. The inclusion of a special 
mental element in ICTR is also a jurisdictional limitation108.  
 
4. Article 7 of the ICC Statute 
Crimes against humanity are defined in article 7 of the ICC Statue. It has 
to be noted that, unlike under the ICTY Statute a nexus with a war is not 
required. The elements that qualify an act as a crime against humanity 
are: (1) The crimes have to be commissioned within the framework of a 
widespread or systematic attack (2) on the basis of a policy – be this 
state or non-state based, and (2) against a civilian population.  
 
Such an attack does not need to be armed. The term “civilian 
population” may also encompass prisoners of war and former 
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combatants. Perpetrators can be civilians or military personnel, state or 
non-state representatives109. 
 
In regard to the actus reus of this crime, the ICC Statute lists eleven 
offences, including the open provision of inhumane acts, which must be 
of a similar character as the other enlisted conducts, aimed at 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental, or physical health. The element of a discriminatory ground is 
only required in regard to the crime of persecution according to 
paragraph (1)(h). 
 
The act being considered as a crime against humanity must occur as part 
of an attack110. An attack is a course of conduct involving multiple 
commissions of acts as referred to in Article 7(1)(a)-(k), which need not 
to be military, and therefore do not equate to an armed conflict in the 
sense of the IHL111. Such an attack must be widespread or systematic, 
meaning it that it has to involve multiple acts or emanate from or 
contribute to a state or organizational policy112. It also has been held 
that these elements are characterised either by their seriousness, or by 
their magnitude, respectively, which means by the fact that they were a 
part of a system designed to spread terror113. 
                                                 
109
 Arnold (The Prosecution of Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity 2004)992. 
110
 (Dixon 2008), 174. 
111
 Elements of Crime, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 2, Introduction to Article 7. 
112
 Dixon (2008), 177. 
113
 Dutch Special Court of Cassations v. Albrecht, printed in Cassese/Gaeta/Jones, ICC-
Commentary, 2002, Vol. 1, at 357. 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and 
 International Criminal Law 
 
43 
  
Also, it is a moot point whether such attacks must always be based on a 
policy, which may be promoted both by state and non-state actors with 
de facto powers. As has been shown above such a requirement has 
been rejected by the ICTY and the ICTR, which have found a very similar 
definition for crimes against humanity as the ICC Statute. It therefore 
can be held that there is no requirement in customary international law 
that a crime against humanity be committed pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a plan or policy114. 
In regard to the mens rea, it suffices that the perpetrator knew about 
the widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population. His or 
her personal motives are irrelevant115.  
 
II. International Jurisprudence on Terrorism as a Crime against 
Humanity 
Under the jurisprudence of ICTY the use of a policy of terror has been 
usually charged under the heading of persecution or inhumane acts116. 
For instance, the court noted in its judgment, while finding the accused 
guilty of persecution for having terrorised the Bosnian Muslim civilians 
in the enclave of Srebrenica that these acts were “crimes of terror” and 
                                                 
114
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“terrorisation”117. Furthermore, it was held that concentration camps 
for Muslims, Croats and other non-Serb detainees, were terrorist tools 
and were consequently considered a crime against humanity, 
specifically the crime of persecution118. It was furthermore held that 
even an isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is the 
product of a political system based on terror or persecution119. The Trial 
Chamber found that as regards the killing and wounding of the 
inhabitants of Ahmici and the destruction of a number of houses and 
mosques, which had had the ultimate goal to spread terror among the 
population so as to deter the members of that particular ethnic group 
from ever returning to their homes. It was concluded that this had 
amounted to the crime against humanity of persecution120. In other 
decisions acts like plundering and wanton destruction, when aimed at 
terrorising the population and based on a discriminatory intent, may 
amount to crimes against humanity121. 
 
ICTR rulings that reflect on the terroristic aspects of crimes against 
humanity are scarcer. Nevertheless, it has been held that non-physical 
aggressions such as the infliction of strong fear or strong terror, 
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intimidation or threat also cause serious mental harm. In the case in 
question the elements of serious mental and physical harm amounted 
to the finding that genocide had occurred, which is a special type of 
crime against humanity122. 
 
In conclusion, the ICTY as well as the ICTR have considered certain acts 
terrorising the civilian population to be breaches of the provisions on 
crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of those 
tribunals is limited in range and time and confined to the territories of 
acts that have occurred during the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.  
 
III. Terrorism as a Crime against Humanity under the ICC Statute 
Since terrorism is not expressly mentioned in Article 7 and terrorism, as 
defined above, has to cause death or serious bodily injury, terrorism 
could be seen as being covered by the sub-categories of crimes against 
humanity pursuant to Article 7(1)(a), (b), (f) and (k). The most relevant 
provision that could cover terrorism is the one of murder as in article 
7(1)(a). 
 
The attacks of September 11 in New York, for instance, were constituted 
of multiple and co-ordinated attacks against a civilian population, 
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causing the deaths of thousands of people in furtherance of Al Qaeda’s 
terrorist policy against the United States of America, which the 
perpetrators knew. Due to this furtherance of an organisational policy 
they were systematic. Since they were aimed at several targets and 
caused the death of many, they were also widespread. Consequently, 
these acts constituted a crime against humanity, article 7(1)(a) ICC 
Statute. 
 
The question arises whether the September 11 attack against the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C. constitutes a crime against humanity. On 
the one hand, the Pentagon is the military headquarters of the United 
States. Therefore, it could be considered that it did not qualify as an 
attack against the civilian population. On the other hand, the victims in 
the airplane were civilians, therefore it could be argued, that this 
already qualifies the attack on the Pentagon as directed against the 
civilian population.  
 
Other events such as the Lockerbie incident would not fulfill the 
elements to be considered a crime against humanity. In this incident 270 
people were killed. Whether this incident was part of a plan to further a 
policy could not be determined, the circumstances being unclear. 
Therefore it cannot be determined whether the incident had been part 
of a systematic attack. Also, the incident was isolated and was not of a 
sufficient magnitude to be considered widespread. 
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Terroristic acts might also be considered an extermination as in article 
7(1)(b). This would be the case, if there were a large number of victims 
and the act was aimed at a certain group123. In respect of modern acts of 
terrorism, the use of a nuclear device against a certain population could 
amount to crime against humanity by extermination. 
 
A terroristic act could also be held to be torture as in article 7(1)(f), if 
there is a sufficient grave effect on the mental state of the civilian 
population. 
 
To fulfil the requirements of an inhumane act as defined in article 
7(1)(k), the perpetrator has to inflict great suffering or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health by means of an inhumane act, such 
an act being of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 
7, paragraph 1 of the Statute, and the perpetrator had to be aware of 
the factual circumstances that established the character of the act. This 
clause could be applicable in the rare cases where serious bodily harm 
was caused but an intent to kill was not present, as long as the acts 
were intended to inflict the kind of damage envisaged by this provision. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Terroristic acts can be considered crimes against humanity under certain 
conditions. If such an act fulfilled the elements required to be 
considered a crime against humanity it would be considered as such by 
international courts. It also can be prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity according to the ICC Statutes. 
 
Nevertheless, there are cases, especially if the question arises whether 
an act was widespread or systematic, when a terroristic act is not 
regarded as a crime against humanity. This is particularly the case if the 
terroristic act is an isolated act with a comparatively small number of 
victims and it cannot be determined if it was aimed at furthering an 
organisational policy, such as the Lockerbie incident. 
 
While terrorism can in some instances be considered a crime against 
humanity, this does not express the specific degree of unlawfulness 
these acts have. Specifically, the intent to coerce the State to act or 
desist from acting in a certain manner is not a requirement of the act to 
be considered a crime against humanity. On the other hand, in some 
cases, even though there is intent to terrorise the civilian population, 
the acts might not be of sufficient magnitude as to amount to a crime 
against humanity.  
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In the case of genocide, which is an aggravated form of crime against 
humanity, a special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group, is necessary, whereas the crime against 
humanity requires proof that the crime was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population124. Similarly, 
the crime of terrorism is also a special intent crime. There is no 
requirement of a systematic or widespread attack for the crime of 
genocide but instead the requirement of a special intent since this gives 
genocide its special degree of unlawfulness. In the case of terrorism, on 
the other hand, the special intent, which makes a crime terroristic in 
nature, finds no expression in the prosecution as a crime against 
humanity. Consequently, it is submitted that even though some 
terroristic acts are covered by the provisions on crimes against 
humanity, this does not lead to an adequate result in regard to the 
punishment of terrorism as an international crime. 
C. Terrorism as a discrete crime under customary international 
law         
As examined above, there is indeed a common definition of terrorism. 
But from the existence of a definition one cannot conclude that there is 
also a crime under customary law. 
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There is a war crime of terrorism under international law, namely the 
war crime of spreading terror. Therefore, it will be examined whether 
there is a discrete crime of terrorism under customary international law 
in time of peace. According to article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law” is, inter alia, a source of law. 
International custom is constituted by two elements, namely State 
practice (usus) and the corresponding view of States (opinio iuris)125. 
Therefore, these are the criteria to determine whether there is a crime 
of terrorism under customary international law. 
 
Most scholars understand terrorism as a transnational crime or treaty-
based crime and not as a discrete crime under international law126. This 
view is based on the idea that there is no corresponding view of what is 
terrorism or that terrorism is no international crime ipso iure. 
  
A common definition of terrorism has been developed, though. 
Therefore, the argument that terrorism is not a distinct crime because it 
lacks definition can be rejected. 
  
Regarding the second argument, it has to be ascertained whether the 
crime of terrorism qualifies as an international crime ipso iure. 
Compared to the so-called core crimes, a crime has to qualify as one of 
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the most serious crimes of international concern to be considered a 
crime under international law127. The seriousness of the crime of 
terrorism can be illustrated by the UN World Summit 2005. There, 
nearly all heads of States had elaborated on the fact that international 
terrorism is one of the main problems of international concern. 
Nevertheless, they failed to agree on a general accepted definition but 
established a “strong political push for a comprehensive convention 
against terrorism”128. In doing so they implicitly stated that there is no 
opinio iuris regarding a crime of terrorism under international law yet.  
Therefore, it can be held that there is a common definition of terrorism, 
but there is no crime of terrorism in times of peace under customary 
international law yet. The hope of the international community to 
criminalise international terrorism is solely based on the Comprehensive 
Convention against Terrorism. 
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Résumé  
Firstly, the large number of international legal instruments against 
terrorism, such as the UN counter-terrorism treaties shows that there 
are ambits of the international community to criminalise the 
phenomena of terrorism, since terrorism is a problem of international 
concern. 
Secondly, there is a core definition of what can be understood as 
terrorism, as has been explained above. Nevertheless, there is still a 
disagreement regarding the scope of application of these instruments. 
This disagreement is due to the fact that a number of States propose to 
avoid the label of terrorism for the so-called “freedom fighters”. Even 
though, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Mr Moussa, has 
stated that the Palestinian struggle for self-determination did not imply 
that innocent civilians might be attacked129, it appears contradictory 
that the Arab League advocates for an exclusion clause for the so called 
freedom-fighters in the Draft Comprehensive Convention. One 
argument supports the view of OIC proposal, though. One might 
understand terrorism in the context of conflicts like the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict as an asymmetrical strategy of violence130, where the one 
side has a modern armed force and the other bands of fighters with 
little organisation and lesser means. In my view, there is no reason to 
exclude members of a modern armed force from being labelled as 
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terrorists when they commit terroristic acts only because they are ruled 
by IHL, while the members of the less structured party should be 
labelled as such. One finding of this research paper is the existence of 
the war crime of spreading terror, which can also be labelled as war 
crime of terrorism, since it is defined by the elements of terrorism. This 
war crime of terrorism has the potential to end the substantial 
inequality in labelling conduct as terroristic and the authors of the 
crimes terrorists. Therefore, including the war crime of terrorism, which 
is indeed a crime under international customary law, expressly into the 
Rome Statute would give a signal to the international community that 
terrorist conduct will always be labelled as such and strongly 
condemned.  
Furthermore, the sound argument by States regarding the arbitrary 
labelling as terrorists, which is constraining the UN Comprehensive 
Convention on Terrorism, would be without foundation.  
Therefore, the war crime of terrorism has the potential to lead the way 
out of the cul-de-sac of the international fight against terrorism and 
could lead to a broader agreement of the States concerning terrorism. 
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